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Abstract—Corporations that offer online trading can achieve a 
competitive edge by serving worldwide clients. Nevertheless, online 
trading faces many obstacles such as the unsecured money orders. 
Phishing is considered a form of internet crime that is defined as 
the art of mimicking a website of an honest enterprise aiming to 
acquire confidential information such as usernames, passwords and 
social security number. There are some characteristics that 
distinguish phishing websites from legitimate ones such as long 
URL, IP address in URL, adding prefix and suffix to domain and 
request URL, etc. In this paper, we explore important features that 
are automatically extracted from websites using a new tool instead 
of relying on an experienced human in the extraction process and 
then judge on the features importance in deciding website 
legitimacy. Our research aims to develop a group of features that 
have been shown to be sound and effective in predicting phishing 
websites and to extract those features according to new scientific 
precise rules. 
 
Keywords- Website features, Phishing, Security, Rule, features 
extraction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Phishing attacks usually aim to acquire confidential 
information such as usernames, passwords and financial IDs by 
fooling users. Phishing attacks typically start by sending an email 
that appears to come from legitimate company to victims asking 
them to update or validate their information by visiting a link 
within the email. Phishers are now employing different 
techniques in creating websites to fool the users and tempting 
them, but they all use a set of common features to design 
phishing websites. This is since, without these features they lose 
the advantage of deception [1]. In general, two approaches are 
employed in identifying the phishing website. The first one is 
based on blacklist [2], by comparing the requested URL with 
those in that list. One drawback of this approach is that the 
blacklist usually cannot cover all phishing websites since within 
seconds a new fraudulent website is expected to be launched. The 
second approach is called heuristic-based, where several features 
are gathered from the website to classify it either phishy or 
legitimate. In contrast to the blacklist method, a heuristics-based 
solution can identify newly created phishing websites in real-
time. The efficiency of heuristic-based method depends on 
selecting a set of discriminative features that could help 
distinguishing phishing websites from legitimate ones. Features 
can be extracted in several ways one of which is manual 
extraction where users derive features and judge on the website 
legitimacy. But users have to spend a lot of time studying the 
latest phishing techniques in order to be up to date with new 
deception methods which is hard for the majority of internet 
users. The second method employed in extracting phishing 
features is automatic extraction. This is accomplished by 
analyzing the webpage and extracting a set of patterns used by 
phishers. The techniques for analyzing the webpages involve 
examining its properties and all its features and patterns. 
Webpage properties are typically derived and extracted from 
HTML tags, URL address and Javascript source code [2] [3] [4]. 
Several studies were conducted about phishing features and their 
effectiveness in the process of predicting the type of websites, but 
these studies lack in defining precise rules to extract the features. 
In other words, most of the rules defined about the phishing 
features are only based on human experience rather than 
scientific experiments. This paper differs from previous research 
works by proposing a group of features that can be extracted 
automatically using our own software tool and depending on 
newly proposed rules that have been developed experimentally. 
Motivation behind the development of a set of rules to 
automatically extract phishing features is to reduce the false 
negative rate which means "classifying phishing website as 
legitimate". Moreover, we want to show that extracting feature 
automatically would be faster than manual extraction, which in 
turn would increase the dataset size and that allow us to conduct 
more experiments. Thus, improving the accuracy of our rules, or 
even adding some other rules. 
In this article, we try to answer the following research questions: 
 
1- What are the effective minimal sets of features that can 
be utilized in predicting phishing? 
2- Can we suggest new rules for automatically extracting 
features?  
 
This article is organized as follows: Sections II and III discuss 
related works and compare different phishing extraction methods 
presented in the literature. Section IV describes the tools we have 
used to extract the features and Section V introduces the structure 
of the proposed phishing features. Finally, section VIII measures 
the significance of the proposed features in detecting phishing 
website. We conclude in Section IX. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The accuracy of predicting the type of the website necessarily 
depends on the extracted features goodness, which has been used 
in the decision process. Now, since most users feel safe against 
 phishing attacks if they utilize an anti-phishing tool, this throws a 
great responsibility for the anti-phishing tools to be accurate in 
predicting phishing. In this context, we believe that developing 
rules of thump to extracting features from website is the key to 
success in this issue. In this section, we review current anti-
phishing approaches and the features they use in developing 
solutions. One approach that was proposed in [5] is a client-side 
defence framework, by developing SpoofGuard (plug-in). This is 
an open source tool [6] that examines the requested webpage and 
notifies the user when a spoof attack is taken place. The spoof 
index is calculated, if the index goes above a level specified by 
the user SpoofGuard warns the user of possible attack. Another 
approach proposed in [3], suggests a way to detect phishing 
websites by capturing abnormal behaviours demonstrated in 
these websites. Structured website consists of W3C DOM 
features [7]. The authors have selected six structural features as 
shown in Table I. After conducting experimentation, the results 
showed that the classifier efficiency depends on “Identity 
Extractor”. Furthermore, the accuracy in this method was 84% 
which is relatively considered low.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A literature survey on Voice Phishing “vishing” and SMS 
Phishing “smishing” utilizing intelligent tools and awareness 
security programs was given in [8]. The authors analyzed 600 
phishing emails, and they collected a set of features, those are 
shown in Table II. They suggested a combination between the 
human and a proper utilization tool to derive better results in 
preventing phishing attack. The experiments conducted against 
the email dataset showed that 22% of the emails were classified 
as suspicious and 78% were classified as phishing. While 95% of 
legitimate emails were classified as non-phishing emails and 5% 
were classified as suspicious. The authors also conducted an 
experiment aiming to evaluate which feature set is more effective 
in predicting type of emails, the results showed that the source 
code features (IP based URL and Non matching URLs, Contain 
scripts, Number of domains) are more significant in predicting 
phishing emails than content features (Generic salutation, 
Security promises, Require a fast response, Links to 
https://domain). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
Extracting features is considered the first step toward judging 
on the website legitimacy. Features extraction may be achieved 
manually, but the human factor bears the burden in extracting 
such features, and that would increase the false negative rate. The 
human methods may also increase the likelihood of exposure to 
phishing attack, for many reasons such as [9]: 
 
1. Users have no idea about how computer systems work. 
2. Ignoring security alerts. 
3. Good visual tricks. 
4. Some users do not distract themselves from the primary 
activities toward extracting phishing features because 
they believe that security system should provide such 
task. 
 
These four reasons were the motivation for us to develop 
precise rules to extract features automatically, so increasing the 
proportion of predicting phishing. As if we compare between the 
results of detecting phishing based on human factor features with 
that of automatically extracted features, we note that 
automatically extracted features results are more accurate since 
research’s reviewed in Section II clearly support this assumption. 
The problem in [5] is that it is based on superficial characteristics 
of current phishing attacks. Some heuristic rules are often 
bypassed by subtle attacks. Some methods were mentioned in the 
same paper to fool the password and image checks. Moreover, 
without wilfulness circumventing SpoofGuard’s detection rules, 
some phishing websites are not detected by SpoofGuard. Also, 
warning user of attack depends mainly on the indexes selected by 
the user himself (i.e. human factor). In [3], capturing abnormal 
behaviours use features that can be extracted from the website 
depending on W3C DOM objects [7]. The results showed that the 
performance of page classifier relays on “Identity Extractor”. 
However, this approach ignores important features that can play a 
key role in determining the legitimacy of website and focused 
only on structural features (website objects or properties). This 
explains the low detection rate. One solution to improve the 
detection rate could be using additional features. Though, this 
approach does not depend on any previous knowledge of the user 
TABLE II. AWARENESS PROGRAM FEATURES 
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fake URL. 
Number of Domains Phishing websites uses multiple domains 
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Generic Salutation Non-personalization of greeting increases the 
phishing possibility.  
Security promises Phishers claims providing good security. 
Requires a fast response To collect information before the website is 
turned off 
Links to https://domain The phishers forward the victim to unsecured 
link.  
 
TABLE I. ANOMALY BASED FEATURES 
Feature Feature Clarification 
Abnormal URL The hostname does not match its claimed identity. 
Abnormal DNS record No record founded in the WHOIS database for the domain. 
Abnormal Anchors In a legitimate website anchors point to same domain. 
Server Form Handler Information’s are not processed on the same domain 
Abnormal cookie Cookies conflicts with website identity. 
Abnormal certificate in 
SSL 
Distinguished Names (DN) within the certificates 
conflicts with the claimed identities. 
 
  
Figure 2 the proposed phishing prediction hierarchical model 
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or experience in computer security. In [8], the responsibility in 
detecting online attacks is a joint effort between human elements 
and computerized tools. The results showed that source code 
features (automatically extracted) have a higher impact in 
predicting threats than content-based features (human based).  
IV. PREPARING FOR FEATURE SELECTION 
To conduct the experiments of producing new rules related to 
phishing features some preparatory steps must be implemented as 
follows: 
 Dataset preparation 
A set of phishing and legitimate websites were gathered from 
Phishtank archive [10]. We collected 2500 phishing URLs.  
 Address bar features 
A JavaScript program was built to extract all features related 
to address bar.  
 Abnormal based features 
A simple PHP script for extracting those features was developed 
since these features deal with servers, and requires connecting to 
external domains such as WHOIS database [11].  
 HTML and JavaScript based features 
A JavaScript program was built to extract these features.  
 Domain based features 
These features can be extracted from WHOIS database [11], and 
from Alexa.com [12]. Further, we developed a PHP script to 
extract these features as shown in Fig 1. 
V. THE PROPOSED COMPUTERIZED BASED FEATURES 
Going back to the approaches presented in Section II, and 
after reviewing surveys, we were able to suggest the phishing 
prediction structure shown in Fig 2. This structure depends on 
extracting features from the webpage itself rather than user 
experience. The proposed structure consists of four main classes 
in which features were classified and placed in the appropriate 
class. First, we examine whether a page contains any text fields, 
since a phishing webpage requires users to input credentials 
through those fields [4]. If a page has at least one text input then 
we proceed to extract the other features. Otherwise, the extraction 
process is terminated. To measure the feature significance in 
detecting phishing we have collected 2500 datasets from the 
PhishTank using our tool and computed each feature frequency 
within the data set in order to reflect the feature importance. So, 
in the next section, every feature will be associated with a weight 
corresponding to the ratio of that feature in the data collection. 
These frequencies will give us an initial indication of how 
influential is the feature in detecting phishing websites. 
 
A. Address Bar based Features 
1. Using the IP Address 
If IP address is used instead of domain name in the URL e.g. 
125.98.3.123 the user can almost be sure someone is trying to 
steal his personal information. Sometimes the IP address is 
transformed to hexadecimal as in the following link: 
http://0x58.0xCC.0xCA.0x62/2/paypal.ca/index.html 
This feature is almost used in all previous studies, which give 
us an indication about its importance, and by reviewing our 
dataset we were able to find 570 URLs having IP address which 
constitute 22.8% of the dataset. To produce a rule for extracting 
this feature, we examine the domain part of the URL which lies 
between // and /, as shown in Fig 3. If the domain part has IP 
address then “True” value is assigned otherwise “False” value 
will be given to this feature. 
 
Rule:  
IF{  
                                       
                        
 
 
2. Long URL to Hide the Suspicious Part 
Phishers can use long URL’s to hide the doubtful part in the 
address bar. Scientifically, there is no reliable length 
distinguishes phishing URLs from legitimate ones. As in [4], the 
proposed length of legitimate URLs is 75 characters or less, but 
the authors did not justify the reason behind their value. To 
ensure accuracy of our study, we calculated the length of URLs 
in the dataset and produced an average URL length. The results 
showed that if the length of the URL is greater than or equal 54 
characters then the URL classified as phishing. By reviewing our 
  
Figure 3 URL Anatomy 
dataset we were able to find 1220 URLs lengths equals to 54 or 
more which constitute 48.8% of the total dataset size. 
 
Rule: 
IF{
                                 
                                                    
                           
 
 
We have been able to update this feature rule by using a 
method based on frequency and thus improving upon its 
accuracy. 
 
3. URL’s having @ Symbol 
Phishers use tricks to give the impression that the URL is 
legitimate using @ symbol in the URL. The browser might 
ignore everything prior the @ symbol since the real address often 
follows the @ symbol. After reviewing our dataset, we were able 
to find 90 URLs having @ symbol which constitute only 3.6% of 
the dataset. Therefore, this feature is not of high significant since 
its presence is rare in the dataset. 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                 
                         
 
 
4. Adding Prefix or Suffix Separated by (-) to Domain 
Dash is rarely used in legitimate URL. Phishers resort to add 
suffixes or prefixes separated by (-) to the domain name. So that 
users feel they are dealing with the legitimate webpage. To 
produce a rule for this feature, we checked the frequency of the 
URL’s in the dataset containing (-) symbol. There was 661 URLs 
having (-) symbol which constitute 26.4%.  
 
Rule:  
IF {                     (– )                       
                         
 
 
5. Sub Domain and Multi Sub Domain 
Assume that we have the following link 
http://www.hud.ac.uk/students/. A domain name always includes 
the top-level domain (TLD), which in our example is “uk.” The 
“ac” part is shorthand for academic and combined “.ac.uk” is 
called a second-level domain (SLD) and “hud” is the actual name 
of the domain. Thus, we note that the legitimate URL link has 
two dots in the URL since we can ignore typing www. To 
produce a rule for extracting this feature, we have first to extract 
(www.) from the URL and then count the dot’s in which if the 
number of dot’s is equal to three then the URL is classified as 
“suspicious” since it has one sub domain. However, if the dots 
are greater than three it is classified as “phishing” since it will 
have multiple sub domains. The dataset contains 1109 URLs 
having three or more dots in domain part which constitute 44.4% 
of the dataset.  
 
 
Rule: 
 IF {
                                     
                                                  
                        
 
 
6. HTTPS (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol with Secure Sockets 
Layer) and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) 
HTTPS is HTTP plus SSL. You need a certificate to use any 
protocol that employs SSL. Legitimate websites utilize secure 
domain names every time sensitive information must be 
transferred. The existence of HTTPS is very important in giving 
the impression of website legitimacy, but it is not enough, since 
in 2005 Netcraft Toolbar Community has recognized more than 
450 phishing URLs using "https" [13]. So we further check the 
certificate assigned with https including the extent of trust of 
certificate issuer, and the certificate age. Certificate Authorities 
that are consistently listed among the top names for trust include 
[14]: GeoTrust, GoDaddy, Network Solutions, Thawte, and 
VeriSign.  By reviewing our dataset we were able to find 2321 
URLs does not support HTTPS or use a fake https which 
constitute 92.8% of the dataset. Unlike some previous researches 
which consider fake HTTPS as a valid without checking the 
certificate authority provider our feature consider these HTTPS 
providers. 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                                      
       
                                                         
                       
 
 
B. Abnormal Based Features 
1. Request URL 
External objects such as images within a webpage are loaded 
from another Domain [3]. For legitimate websites, most of 
objects within the webpage are linked to the same domain. For 
example, if the URL typed in address bar was 
http://www.hud.ac.uk/students/, we extract the keyword      
<src=> from the website source code and check whether the 
domain in the URL is different from that in <src>.  If the result is 
true the website is classified as “phishing”. To develop a rule for 
this feature, we calculate the rate of URLs in source code of the 
 website that have different domain than the domain typed at the 
address bar. If the rate is less than 20% the website is considered 
“legitimate” else if the rate is between 20% and 50% then the 
website considered “suspicious”. Otherwise the website is 
considered “phishy”. Our dataset contains 2500 URLs having 
this feature which constitute 100 % of the dataset. This result 
reveals the importance of this feature in detecting phishing.  
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                      
       
                                               
                          
 
 
2. URL of Anchor 
An anchor is an element defined by the <a> tag. We check  
(1) whether the domain of anchor is different from that of the 
website, and if so the website is classified as phishing. This is 
similar to request URL feature.  
(2) If the anchor does not link to any webpage, e.g.: 
<a href=“#”>, 
<a href=“#content”>, 
<a href=“#skip”>,  
<a href=“JavaScript ::void(0)”> 
Then the website is classified as phishing. By reviewing our 
dataset, we were able to find 581 URLs having this feature which 
constitute 23.2%.  
 
Rule:  
IF
{
 
 
 
 
                                 
        
                                                
                       
 
 
 
3. Server Form Handler 
SFH that contains empty string or “about:blank” are 
considered doubtful since an action should be taken upon 
submitted information. Furthermore, if the domain name in SFH-
s is different than the domain of the webpage this gives an 
indication that the webpage is suspicious because the form is 
rarely handled by external domain server. By checking our 
dataset we were able to find 101 URLs having SFHs which 
constitute only 4.0% of the dataset size 
 
Rule:  
IF {
        about:blamk                                   
            refer  to different domain                     
                         
 
 
4. Abnormal URL 
This feature can be extracted from WHOIS database [11] 
when the host name in URL does not match its claimed identity. 
For a legitimate websites, identity is typically part of its URL. 
412 URLs having this feature founded in our dataset which 
constitute 16.4%.  
 Rule:  
IF { 
                                                    
                      
 
 
C. HTML and JavaScript based Features: 
1. Redirect Page 
Open redirects found on web sites are liable to be exploited 
by phishers to create a link to their site. This makes the link look 
genuine, as it appears legitimate web site and acceptable if the 
site is served using SSL. When a user clicks on the link, he may 
be unaware that he is redirected to the phishing site. 249 URLs 
having redirect page were encountered in our dataset which 
constitute 10%.  
Rule:  
IF {
                                
                                                    
                        
 
 
2. Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link  
Phishers may use JavaScript to display a fake URL in the 
status bar to the users. 496 URLs having this feature were 
founded in our dataset which constitute 20%.  
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                               
        
                                               
                      
 
 
3. Disabling Right Click  
Phishers use JavaScript to disable the right click function, so 
that users cannot view and save the source code. 40 URLs were 
founded in which the right click is disabled in our dataset which 
constitute 1.6% of the entire dataset. 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                    
                                                         
                      
 
 
4. Using PopUp Window 
It’s unusual to find a legitimate website asking users to 
submit their credentials through a popup window. 227 URLs 
were founded in our dataset in which the users credential 
submitted through a popup window which constitutes 9.1%  
 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                       
                                             
                        
 
 
 
 
 D. Domain based Features 
1. Age of Domain 
This feature can be extracted from WHOIS database [11]. If 
the domain created less than one year it is classified as “phishing”, 
else if the domain age is more than one year and less than 2 years 
then it’s classified as “suspicious” otherwise the website is 
considered “legitimate”. A PHP script was created to connect to 
WHOIS database [11] and make a query about the domain age. 
2392 URLs created less than 12 months or will expire within the 
coming 3 months which constitute 95.6%. 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                      
                                                      
                        
 
 
2. DNS Record 
This feature can be extracted from WHOIS database [11]. For 
phishing sites, either the claimed identity in not recognized by 
WHOIS database or the record of the hostname is not founded [3]. 
If the DNS record is empty or not found then the website is 
classified as “phishing”, otherwise it’s classified as legitimate. 
160 URL were found in our dataset where the DNS record is not 
found, and that constitute 6.4%. 
 
Rule:  
IF {
                                                         
                             
 
 
3. Website Traffic  
This feature can be extracted from Alexa database [12]. If the 
domain has no traffic or not being recognized by Alexa database it 
is classified as “phishing” otherwise if the website ranked among 
the top 100,000 it’s classified as “legitimate” else it’s classified as 
“Phishing”. This feature has not been used before in any previous 
study. When reviewing our dataset we noticed that this feature has 
a high significant in predicting phishing websites, since it can 
measure the popularity of the URL. To extract this feature a PHP 
script has been developed to connect to Alexa server and make a 
query about the popularity of the URL, the result we get from our 
query is as shown in Fig 1. This feature constitutes 89.2% of the 
dataset since it appears 2331 times.  
 
Rule: 
 IF {
                                         
                                         
                            
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article groups features that are effective in detecting 
phishing websites. These features are automatically extracted 
without any intervention from the users and using computerized 
developed tool. We managed to collect and analyze 17 different 
features that distinguish phishing website from legitimate ones. 
Then, we developed a new rule for each feature. These rules can 
be useful in applications related to discovering phishing websites 
based on features. The process of extracting features using our 
tool is much faster and reliable than manual extraction and thus, 
the size of the dataset increases dramatically and that allow us to 
study large number of phishing pages and legitimate. After 
calculating the frequency for each feature, the results showed that 
“Request URL” has the highest significant in detecting phishing 
websites since it is presented in all dataset case, followed by “Age 
of Domain” which presented in 2392 dataset case. The next 
significant feature is “HTTPS and SSL” feature with frequency of 
92.8%. The lowest significant feature in distinguishing phishing 
website is “Disabling Right Click” feature which has only 
appeared forty times, followed by “URL having @ symbol” 
feature which constituted 3.6% of the dataset size. In near future, 
several experiments will be conducted using data mining 
algorithms to extract new hidden rules concerning phishing and 
then modify the existing rules or adding new rules, if necessary.  
 
References 
[1] L. James , Phishing Exposed, Syngress Publishing, 2005.  
[2] Nuttapong Sanglerdsinlapachai and Arnon Rungsawang, “Using Domain Top-
page Similarity Feature in Machine Learning-based Web,” in Third 
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 2010.  
[3] Y. Pan and X. Ding, “Anomaly Based Web Phishing Page Detection,” in In 
ACSAC '06: Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference., Dec. 2006.  
[4] R. B. Basnet, A. H. Sung and Q. Liu, “Rule-Based Phishing Attack 
Detection,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and 
Management-SAM'11, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 2011.  
[5] Neil Chou, Robert Ledesma, Yuka Teraguchi, Dan Boneh and John C. 
Mitchell, “Client–side defense against web–based identity theft,” in 11th 
Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04), 
San Diego, February, 2004..  
[6] “SpoofGuard,” [Online]. Available: 
http://crypto.stanford.edu/SpoofGuard/download.html. [Accessed 16 
January 2012]. 
[7] “W3C,” [Online]. Available: http://www.w3.org/TR/DOM-Level-2-HTML/. 
[Accessed 17 February 2012]. 
[8] O. Salem, H. Alamgir and K. M, “Awareness Program and AI based Tool to 
Reduce Risk of Phishing Attacks,” in Computer and Information 
Technology (CIT),2010 IEEE 10th International Conference., June 29 2010-
July 1 2010.  
[9] S. E. Schechter, R. Dhamija, A. Ozment and I. Fischer, “The Emperor's New 
Security Indicators,” in Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, Washington, DC, USA, 2007.  
[10] “PhishTank,” October 2006. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.phishtank.com/. [Accessed 25 November 2011]. 
[11] “WhoIS,” [Online]. Available: http://who.is/. [Accessed 13 March 2012]. 
[12] “Alexa the Web Information Company,” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.alexa.com/. [Accessed 26 January 2012]. 
[13] “More than 450 Phishing Attacks Used SSL in 2005,” [Online]. Available: 
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/12/28/more_than_450_phishing_atta
cks_used_ssl_in_2005.html. [Accessed 8 March 2012]. 
[14] “Best SSL Certificates,” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bestsslcertificates.com/articles27.html. [Accessed 8 March 
2012]. 
